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The Economics of Convention: From the Practice of 
Economics to the Economics of Practice 
Olivier Favereau ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Economics of convention: Von der Praxis der Ökonomie zur 
Ökonomie der Praktiken«. There would not have been an economics of conven-
tion (EC) without the use of the word “convention” in chapter 12 of the “The 
General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money” (1936) by Keynes, and 
without the book “Convention. A Philosophical Study” (1969), by the philoso-
pher and mathematician David Lewis. But representatives of EC reinterpret the 
usual reading of those two texts. They extract from the first one the idea of a 
convention as regulating a professional community (the financial one and the 
academic one in economics). As for the second one, they privilege the final re-
vision of Lewis’ initial game-theoretic definition, which puts non-observable 
“beliefs” on a par with observable “actions.” The coherence between both ele-
ments can only be produced by the emergence of a “(social) practice.” There-
fore a very different practice of economics is promoted by EC (for instance re-
unifying coordination and reproduction). Following Foucault who studied states 
as a practice (through the notion of “governmentality”), we study business 
firms as a practice. Because of the gap between the legal person (corporation 
whose members are the share-holders) and the economic organization (with all 
its stake-holders), the firm as a practice needs to be regulated by a convention, 
in order to make the inequality not unbearable for workers. Otherwise the 
working of the firm as a dispositive of collective creation would be blocked. We 
conclude that conventions, practices, and dispositives belong to the same ana-
lytical space. 
Keywords: Keynes, Lewis, Foucault, coordination, reflexivity, bad convention, 
social practice, legal person, dispositive, language. 
1.  Introduction 
In this special issue of HSR devoted to “Markets, organizations, and law – 
perspectives of convention theory on economic practices and structures”, my 
objective is to answer two series of questions, from my position as an econo-
mist, working within the conventionalist research program: 
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1) What are the main features of that research program in social sciences, at 
least within economics? And what does it imply, a priori, about such 
classical objects of economic analysis as “markets,” “organizations” and 
even “law” (a more recent object, to say the truth, but nowadays a major 
one)? Could we define something that helps us consider a piece of eco-
nomic analysis as specifically “conventionalist”? 
2) Since business firms are economic entities obviously mixing “markets,” 
“organizations” and “law,” is there anything like a conventionalist theory 
of the nature of the firm, which could be contrasted with (for instance) 
the celebrated paper of Ronald Coase entitled “The nature of the firm” 
(1937)? 
In the end, I hope I have reached both objectives, the first one in the first part 
of this contribution, the second one in its second part. But the pedagogical logic 
of the exposition does not mirror the genetic logic of the argument. The actual 
key was to realize, by reading Foucault’s 1979 seminar at Collège de France 
on state as a practice (rather than an essence), that what recent conventionalist 
research at the Collège des Bernardins (located in Paris)1 on business firm have 
arrived at is exactly that: a practice, of course quite different from the state. 
Although our indebtedness toward Foucault is, for this reason, of the highest 
level, it is not without a critical tone. Viewing practice as the nature of the firm 
(of course a specific one) reveals a weakness of Foucault’s thought about law. 
But emphasizing the theoretical link between practice and convention entails 
many more benefits. The most important one is to induce a new (re)reading of 
the two books without which there would not have been the so-called econom-
ics of convention (in short EC), at least among institutionalist economics:2 
“The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” of the greatest 
economist of the 20th century John Maynard Keynes (1936) and “Convention. 
A Philosophical Study” (1969) of the young mathematician, philosopher, and 
logician David Lewis, one of the founders of modern possible-worlds seman-
tics. And it so happens that these two (re)readings3 offer, I think, a definite 
clarification of our projected answers to the two series of questions mentioned 
at the beginning. There is one more benefit of understanding that the concept of 
(social) practice is central for the economics of convention. As readers of His-
torical Social Research know, there is another way for entering the conven-
                                                             
1  See for more information <https://www.collegedesbernardins.fr/english-pages>. 
2  It is difficult to speak for sociology. But apparently, there were no previous sociological 
books at the origin of EC, as we have in economics. It is true to say that the book of David 
Lewis is not exactly an economic book, and it could be claimed by social science researchers 
too, even if I am not aware that such claims are numerous. 
3  This clumsy phrase is necessary to warn the reader that within Keynes’s book, it is one 
chapter that is put to the fore (a neglected chapter for several decades) and Lewis’s book 
completely changes its meaning through the correction of an error by the author himself (a 
neglected revision by most commentators). 
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tionalist research program, a sociological one, more precisely, from pragmatic 
sociology, with its two philosophical branches: Weberian/Ricoeurian herme-
neutics and pragmatist philosophy (from Dilthey to Rorty).4 The dual nature of 
the economics of convention will be completely confirmed by this contribution, 
since it concludes that the pragmatist idea of practice is the natural companion 
of the economic idea of convention, without explicitly borrowing from either 
sociological or philosophical pragmatism (but with some help from Foucault’s 
last seminars). 
In the first part, I will show that the best way to identify the main constitu-
tive features of EC is to read them through the story of the emergence of a new 
practice, within the realm of social science research, and a fortiori economic 
science, under this heading “economics of convention.” In the second part, I 
will present a recent result established along conventionalist lines: the nature of 
the firm (as that of state according to Foucault) is that of a practice, in an ex-
tremely specific meaning, where law plays a major albeit special role: what is 
decisive is not its functionality, as one would have expected; it is rather some 
kind of structural dysfunctionality, that was missed by Foucault. 
2.  The Keynesian Root of EC: The Practice of Economics  
The reader will not be surprised if we start our overview of the economics of 
conventions from the notion of “convention” itself, not a familiar word in the 
semantics of economics (and indeed of social sciences in general). The first 
thing to understand, if not the most important, is that there would have been no 
such thing as “economics of convention,” would Keynes have excluded the 
word “convention” from chapter 12, paragraph IV, from the final version of 
“The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” (1936). That chap-
ter is the heart of the Keynesian criticism against the neo-classical explanation 
of involuntary unemployment. As suggested in the introduction, I add an auxil-
iary condition of possibility: the publication in 1969 by a young American 
philosopher of a small book combining formal logic (more precisely possible-
words semantics) entitled “Convention. A Philosophical Study,” with a fore-
word by another American philosopher Willard van Orman Quine, well known 
for his devastating criticism of logical positivism (1951). It will be at the heart 
of the second part of this paper. 
A last warning to avoid misinterpretation: I do not suggest that EC proceeds 
directly from these so different books. I suggest on the contrary that it comes 
from a creative (re)reading of those sources, far from their usual reading. And 
                                                             
4  See the contributions in Diaz-Bone and Salais (eds.) (2011), and the references in the intro-
duction of this Special Issue. 
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the clear understanding of the distance between our conventionalist (re)reading 
and the conventional reading is the shortest way for a non-economist to grasp 
the distinctive features of the conventionalist program of research, at least the 
economic part of it. 
2.1. The Conventionalist Reading of Keynes 
In the usual reading of Keynesian economics, exemplified by IS-LM model, 
due to Hicks (1937), the whole of chapter 12 is skipped, as if its content was 
superfluous to extract the final message of Keynesian economics. What is 
retained is that the rate of interest is too high to promote enough effective de-
mand, and the reason of it is the presence of a speculative element in the de-
mand for money. Then the analysis quickly drifts toward the necessity of pub-
lic investment and budget deficit to compensate the deficiency of private 
demand. That is not wrong, but that hides the revolutionary foundation of the 
Keynes’s argument: i.e., the conventionalist one. 
We may quote chap.12, § IV at length. After all it is the birth place of EC 
and by putting this quotation at the front-piece of this article it already brings a 
valuable and objective information to the reader: Keynes is the first conven-
tionalist economist, although such was not his intention, nor his claim.5 
In practice we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to fall back on what is, in truth, a 
convention. The essence of this convention – though it does not, of course, 
work out quite so simply – lies in assuming that the existing state of affairs 
will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to ex-
pect a change. This does not mean that we really believe that the existing state 
of affairs will continue indefinitely. We know from extensive experience that 
this is most unlikely. The actual results of an investment over a long term of 
years very seldom agree with the initial expectation. Nor can we rationalize 
our behavior by arguing that to a man in a state of ignorance errors in either 
direction are equally probable, so that there remains a mean actuarial expecta-
tion based on equiprobabilities. For it can easily be shown that the assumption 
of arithmetically equal probabilities based on a state of ignorance leads to ab-
surdities. We are assuming, in effect, that the existing market valuation, how-
ever arrived at, is uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the 
facts which will influence the yield of the investment, and that it will only 
change in proportion to changes in this knowledge; though, philosophically 
speaking it cannot be uniquely correct, since our existing knowledge does not 
provide a sufficient basis for a calculated mathematical expectation. (Keynes 
1936, chap. 12 § IV; italics in the original) 
                                                             
5  I do not mean that Keynes underscores his concept of convention: his summary of General 
Theory for the US academic community (Keynes 1937) proves the opposite. 
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2.1.1 The Discovery of Convention through the Working of the 
Financial Market 
Let us make a first comment simply to pinpoint the main analytical features of 
this new object introduced by Keynes: convention. In this chapter Keynes was 
wondering how a unique price could emerge for each financial asset (for in-
stance a share) on an organized market like the financial market – and that 
result is badly needed if the market is to work at all. Rationally, each individual 
investor should compute the sum of expected actuarial values of the dividends. 
But for Keynes, radical uncertainty about future makes this computation not 
impossible but simply extremely dubious. That is a first reason to be interested 
in similar computations by other people: maybe they are better informed than 
us and then we should imitate them. But we know by experience this too is 
dubious. Moreover a second reason, specific to the financial market, obliges us 
to consider what others think (and do, if it is observable): the individual inves-
tor could gain (or lose) much more by selling or buying assets, than by waiting 
for the series of annual dividends of the assets he owns. Then he has nothing to 
do but desperately try to guess what all the other investors think (or will do). 
But they too are more or less in the same situation (except if there are better 
informed agents). The financial market is at every moment faced with a deep 
problem of coordination between rational agents, the solution of which is logi-
cally indeterminate. And Keynes suggests that the financial community has 
found a solution: a convention, whose primary property is that “the existing 
state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific 
reasons to expect a change.” Notice that the content of convention is crafted on 
imitation behaviors, in a subtle way: it implies a high level of critical reflexivi-
ty (“except in so far as …”) and it requires the invention of a fictitious collec-
tive entity (“the existing state of affairs …” which Keynes more clearly calls 
the “state of the market” in other places): that defines the true level of imitation 
– introducing then the unavoidable divide between bulls and bears. Keynes was 
a speculator keen enough to know that the market breaks down when every-
body is either bull or bear. At each time, fortunately we have both: there is a lot 
of variety within those imitation behaviors. 
For the moment, let us neglect all other aspects of that solution than the fol-
lowing ones: (i) it is linked with the practice6 of a professional community 
(e.g., the financial investors); (ii) as a rule, it is not enforced by law, but by a 
mix of conformism and rationality; (iii) it solves a major problem of coordina-
tion within our capitalist world (of course that does not exclude there also are 
conventions solving minor or local coordination problems), with the double 
meaning of major: macro and/or important – we should never lose sight of that 
fact: for Keynes, the massive involuntary unemployment after the 1929 crisis is 
                                                             
6  The quotation above begins with “in practice.”  
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caused by the conventional nature of the rate of interest, established at too high 
a level;7 (iv) the last example suggesting that coordination, a priori a good 
thing, may also be something to be criticized, on a second thought: there could 
be “bad conventions,”8 from a certain normative point of view (which remains 
to be defined). 
2.1.2 The Generalization of Convention outside the Financial 
Community 
Now we can introduce the second departure made by our conventionalist read-
ing from the conventional one. By introducing the concept of convention with 
respect to a social practice, Keynes invites his readers to look outside the pecu-
liar case of the professional community of financial investors. If economists are 
right to suppose that the financial community is regulated by conventions, then 
why should not the same be said about the functioning of their own academic 
community? Not only this generalization is not far-fetched, but it is the sole 
means to make sense of a recurrent thread which goes through the 24 chapters 
of the General Theory: the denunciation of something Keynes calls (another 
semantic innovation!) “orthodoxy” or “orthodox economics” or “classical 
economics” – we conventionalists would now say “conventional economics.”9 
Moreover a careful study of the writing of General Theory between 1930 and 
1936 reveals that Keynes became conscious (around 1933) of the existence and 
strength of classical economics as the undisputable paradigm about how to 
practice serious economic theory within the academic community. And he 
wanted to move this paradigm, which implied, rather than inventing an entirely 
new formal language, to look for the minimal changes within the conventional 
economics to get involuntary massive unemployment as a possible and stable 
solution. He thought that this pragmatic strategy would be more efficient to 
convince his fellow economists to change their mind.10 
It is true that Keynes did not use the word “convention” for “orthodoxy” nor 
“conventional economics” for “classical economics” and I concede the task of 
his conventionalists descendants would have been simpler. Maybe because he 
                                                             
7  Which depresses irreversible physical investment outlays, and so effective demand for the 
goods produced by the firms, which will then decrease the number of jobs relatively to the 
available workforce. That suggests that the market failure responsible for unemployment 
lies not in the labor market and its supposedly downward rigidity of wages (the convention-
al liberal stance, up to now), but in the financial market and its paradoxical downward ri-
gidity of returns demanded by the financial investors. 
8  For an excellent overview of this essential concept, see Larquier (2016). As for Keynes, see 
Favereau (2013). 
9  The phrase was re-used by Galbraith (1958) but in a rather loose sense: “conventional wisdom.“ 
10  During that period, he had intense discussions with the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
who was moving from his first philosophy to the second one, centered on the concept of 
language-games (cf. Favereau 2005, 2013). 
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thought that orthodoxy was a convention of a much higher order than the level 
of interest rates. Maybe also because he was aware of some religious flavor in 
the way economists define the real world as amenable to scientific analysis and 
deserving their attention. Anyway, we are faced with the first sketch of a gen-
eral theoretical proposition about convention and social practice, at least for 
professional communities. Could the generalization extend to all professional 
communities? We leave this question open, for the moment, and we return to 
the academic community of economists, with a last argument to confirm our 
reading of Keynes. In pure logic it could be that Keynes is wrong, economists 
being a professional community, which miraculously escapes that constraint of 
being regulated by a deep cognitive convention. That objection could be easily 
discarded: first the burden of the proof lies on the shoulders of economists, 
denying it, and they will have to explain why “mainstream” is such a common 
expression among economists (whether orthodox or not). Moreover, I fear that 
trying to prove this unique “unconventionality” of the economists leads rather 
to confirm the contrary: even financial investors, according to Keynes, seem 
less fooled by their own convention. In the Keynes quotation, it is striking how 
much the financial investors are not prisoners of the conventional view. In that 
world of imitation, everybody seems anxious to be the first to see the moment 
when the convention will change. Would it be possible that mainstream econ-
omists are less rational than the economic agents they model? 
2.2 A First Characterization of EC as a Research Program in 
Human and Social Sciences 
Now we can at last say something fundamental about the foundations of EC. 
Although convention seems connected with imitation, i.e., conformism, the 
most abstract foundation is rather surprising: it is an appeal to reflexivity for 
social scientists, and especially for economists. The economics of convention is 
an endeavor first to make explicit the conventions of economics – and second 
to change them, if they appear to be “bad” conventions, according to norma-
tive criteria, which then have to be made explicit. Therefore, it is not prima 
facie a new economic theory (nor a new social science theory), it is a (proposal 
of a) new practice11 of economic theory (and of social science). 
The problem is now: what are the conventions of economics? Let us again 
quote Keynes at the time he was writing the final version of the General Theory: 
We fall into two main groups. What is it that makes the cleavage which thus 
divides us? On the one side are those who believe that the existing economic 
system is, in the long run, a self-adjusting system, though with creaks and 
groans and jerks, and interrupted by time lags, outside interference and mis-
                                                             
11  I agree with Rainer Diaz-Bone that pragmatism is the natural philosophical background of 
the economics of conventions, even if Keynes has no link with this philosophical strand. 
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takes. […] These authorities do not, of course, believe that the system is au-
tomatically or immediately self-adjusting. But they do believe that it has an 
inherent tendency towards self-adjustment, if it is not interfered with and if the 
action of change and chance is not too rapid. 
On the other side of the gulf are those who reject the idea that the economic 
system is, in any significant sense, self-adjusting. They believe that the failure 
of effective demand to reach the full potentialities of supply, in spite of human 
psychological demand being immensely far from satisfied for the vast majori-
ty of individuals, is due to much more fundamental causes. […] 
The strength of the self-adjusting school depends on its having behind it the 
whole body of organized economic thinking and doctrine of the last hundred 
years. This is a formidable power. It is the product of acute minds and has per-
suaded and convinced the great majority of the intelligent and disinterested 
persons who have studied it. It has vast prestige and a more far-reaching influ-
ence than is obvious. For it lies behind the education and the habitual modes 
of thought, not only of economists, but of bankers and business men and civil 
servants and politicians of all parties. […] 
Now I range myself with the heretics (Keynes, nov.1934, cf. 1973, 486-7) 
In the General Theory, the convention of self-adjusting system behind ortho-
dox economics is formulated in a more technical way: either Say’s law (supply 
creates its own demand) or the whole of savings is invested, etc., but the sub-
stance is the same.  
The authors of the Revue économique, in 1989, (a special issue of an estab-
lished French economic journal and seminal for EC), writing more than sixty 
years after the Keynesian message, could of course be more precise, all the 
more so because mainstream economics have changed, in depth, but still re-
mained built upon a central conventional core. Let us try to specify it (while 
indicating what can be traced back to the time of Keynes and what is really 
new). 
Around 1870, the classical thought (stricto sensu, not in Keynes’s meaning) 
experienced a big divide between a line of thought privileging “coordination” 
and its possible failures (the neo-classical or marginalist strand) and another 
line stressing “reproduction” and its necessary critique (the Marxian or struc-
turalist way). Nevertheless, both currents were to adopt a roughly similar posi-
tion, with respect to two questions: first the question of moral values – it has to 
be firmly pushed outside the sphere of economic analysis; second the question 
of individual rationality – it has to be neatly separated from either coordination 
(e.g., in the theory of general equilibrium, each economic agent follows his 
own interests, and no one cares about coordination), or reproduction (e.g., for 
Marx, capitalists by increasing capital/labor in order to get super-profits uncon-
sciously activate the tendency of decreasing profits). The (largely implicit, even 
unconscious) postulate of independence between the three dimensions “moral 
values”/“individual rationality”/“interindividual coordination” (or class repro-
duction, in the case of Marx) was, I think, quite present in the mind of Keynes, 
HSR 44 (2019) 1  │  33 
even if I put it in terms that could not be used by him, with this (now common-
place) clear-cut distinction12 between the three dimensions. It is not difficult to 
show that the idea of a “self-adjusting system” supposes a strict independence 
between values, rationality, and coordination: the recourse to moral values is 
not necessary, it is enough to let individual agents follow their own will, and 
the market will progressively restore its equilibrium. And the fact that it is 
upheld by the dominant groups, in spite of a contrary evidence, works for the 
reproduction of a system, unfavorable to the victims of the lasting disequilibria, 
whereas a discretionary public would be necessary. 
During the decade 1970, there was a major turn in either the individualist 
school of thought (with an attempt to endogenize coordination, in terms of 
individual rationality, through game theory and contract theory) or the structur-
alist one to do the same for reproduction: Bourdieu’s sociology explains the 
reproduction of the fields by the strategies of the dominant groups and the 
habitus of the dominated people. The authors of the 1989 issue of Revue 
économique wanted clearly to extend the Keynesian revolution up to the cri-
tique of the neo-liberal adjustments of the conventional economics, belonging 
to the time of Keynes. 
My hypothesis about the (re)reading of Keynes’s chapter 12, stressing for 
the first time the concept of “convention,” is that the neo-liberal turn, at least in 
the individualist school of thought, was a powerful incentive to give attention to 
that (apparently) small part of Keynes’s argument, for two reasons: the accent 
first put on uncertainty (and therefore on how a computational rationality could 
handle it, when there are no numeric probabilities), and second put on contracts 
and institutions, which are a system of rules, and conventions are a special 
subset of the set of rules. That opens the way to explain the role of the book by 
David Lewis, which I will comment, in the next part of this contribution. 
But now I have given more than minimal information, following the 
Keynesian source, to try a pedagogical digest:  
EC is a research program in human and social sciences,  
(i) which aims at displacing the conventions of the formal language of economic 
thought, towards stressing “coordination” (including coordination failures) without 
insulating it from “reproduction” (including critics of reproduction), and vice-versa,  
(ii) by endowing individuals with an interpretive (and not only computational) ra-
tionality, including a capacity of normative judgments, the models of which may be 
borrowed from the relevant human and social sciences, when it is required by a 
criterion of realism (vs. instrumentalism) and understanding (vs. explaining).13 
                                                             
12  Due to the mathematical formulation of the theory of general equilibrium, which comes 
later (Hicks 1939), partly under the influence of General Theory (cf. Clower [1975] for this 
paradoxical impact). 
13  Understanding is an additional key to realism when we are talking about human/social 
sciences (and not only on natural sciences). Cf. Ricoeur (1986) for a sophisticated view of 
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The readers could check by themselves that this “definition” exemplifies the 
properties (i) to (iv) of the Keynesian convention,14 mutatis mutandis (since we 
skip from the financial community to the economists’ academic community). 
Most parts of the “definition” could be deduced from our (re)reading of 
Keynes’s epistemological, philosophical, and political position. What is lacking 
is the introduction of an interpretive rationality (although we can guess that we 
need cognitive capacities other than calculative ones in order to decipher con-
ventions), and probably the non-specialist reader would need more on realism 
vs. instrumentalism, and understanding vs. explaining (although Keynes 
strongly insisted on the involuntary, therefore painful, aspect of unemploy-
ment). It is what we shall complete in the next part, with the help, first, of a 
(re)reading of Lewis (1969), and second of an application to the theory of busi-
ness firm. 
3. The Lewisian Root of EC: The Economics of Practice 
For a Keynesian economist, the philosopher David Lewis is attractive, on two 
grounds. First he develops a formal analysis of the (non-numerical) notion of 
possibility – which could be an alternative to the formal analysis of (numeric) 
probabilities, rejected by Keynes in his 1921 book (at least, as a general way of 
handling the working of the human mind, in front of uncertainty). This will not 
retain our attention here.15 Secondly he published Convention: A Philosophical 
Study in 1969: quite a strange philosophical dissertation, since it uses game 
theory (after having attended the courses of the future Nobel prize in econom-
ics Thomas Schelling, at Princeton) to tackle one of the most venerable conun-
dra of philosophy: if language is a (set of) convention(s), how is it possible for 
a human collectivity to agree on it, since there is (by hypothesis) no available 
language to start a discussion, nor (reasonably) to conclude by an explicit 
agreement? Therefore his methodological strategy was to devise a general 
theory of conventions without language, and then to apply it to the question of 
language. Since Keynes’s convention16 is such a special and big object, we 
could hope to get possible models for all other kinds of conventions, even 
“small” ones. Indeed it will be the case.  
                                                                                                                                
the debate on explaining vs. understanding, which, I think, is shared by most conventionalist 
researchers. Cf. Favereau (2018) for the link with interdisciplinary research. 
14  Cf. above, § 2.1.1. 
15  I tried to translate the Keynesian view of uncertainty in the possible-worlds semantics of 
David Lewis (Favereau 1988). I must admit that David Lewis was not enthusiastic with my 
using his framework (personal exchange), without unfortunately telling me the arguments 
for his discontent. 
16 Of which Lewis seems not to be aware (which was quite understandable at that time). 
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But that will not be the greatest contribution of David Lewis to the future 
economics of conventions. His best contribution was his complete failure, with 
the discrete solution he found to mend his initial theory. So discrete that no one 
sees the significance of both the failure and its solution, no one except the 
conventionalist researchers.17 
Let us see, in a first part, what his contribution, both initial and final, con-
sists of, and then, in a second part, apply what we have found through this story 
to the special case of the business firm. The result is, I think, a deep under-
standing of the interdependence between convention and social practice – 
which calls for nothing less than a scientific revolution in social science. 
3.1 Lewis’s Initial and Final Contributions to EC 
3.1.1 The Breakthrough and the Narrowness of the 1969 Definition 
of Convention  
Lewis opens his book with a list of 11 “coordination problems,” eventually 
leading to a “convention,” solving the relevant coordination problem. The most 
pedagogical one is the celebrated cut off in a telephone call (it seems that it was 
a recurrent problem in the village where David Lewis was living). To restore 
the connection, one of the two interlocutors should call back, but neither both, 
nor no-one (thinking that the other will do it). The convention emerges in his 
village that the first caller is the one who calls back. We can extract some im-
portant features from this example, simple though it may be.  
First we regain common-sense use of “conventions”: a kind of rule with four 
distinctive features: implicit (no canonical expression), arbitrary (multiple 
alternatives), of unknown origin, and not legally enforced. Second it appears in 
some definite contexts: a coordination problem is a situation where we have a 
strong individual interest in adopting the same solution, but it does not matter 
at all which solution is adopted18 or, if it matters, it matters much less than the 
failure of coordination: a bad coordination (i.e., the adoption of a solution that 
is not your preferred one) would be incomparably better than no coordination at 
all. So we owe to David Lewis a powerful general hypothesis19 about the type 
of situation where the emergence of conventions could be expected – and it is a 
pragmatic problem of (inter)acting. 
                                                             
17  The book edited by Batifoulier in 2001 was the first to stress the distance between “conven-
tion” in Lewis (1969) (or usual game theory) and “convention” according to EC (including 
Keynes’s notion). In the foundational issue of EC (Dupuy et al. 1989), Dupuy rightfully used 
Lewis’s amended definition, but without elaborating the reason of the amendment. 
18  Another example of Lewis is driving on the right or left hand side of the road. 
19  The reader is warned by Lewis himself at the very beginning of his book (1969, 3) that this 
hypothesis, even if neatly formulated within game theory, is independent of that 
framework.  
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We can draw two essential but paradoxical conclusions from this characteri-
zation: on one hand these situations are much more frequent than the grandiose 
cases studied by Keynes. It seems that conventions belong to the structure of 
everyday life and especially outside the field of economy (not to say econom-
ics) stricto sensu. Therefore, economics has to cross its own borders, to do its 
own job. But on the other hand, the coordination problems are not the whole of 
economic, social, etc., situations. For instance, there are also situations of pure 
conflict, or mixing cooperation and conflict. That is a lesson for EC: it should 
not restrict itself to the economics of, or even with, conventions. We should 
remember the lesson of Keynes: the economics we are searching for wants to 
make intelligible the economy of a world where we expect to find something 
usually called “conventions” to solve coordination problems, in extremely 
important fields as well as in extremely modest ones. It is the reason why the 
tentative “definition” of EC supra mentions conventions, of course, but within 
a whole change of the practice of economics, implying new concepts of coor-
dination, reproduction and rationality, about which we have not said much until 
now. And many things will become clearer after introducing the “second” 
David Lewis. 
Up to now, we have done as if Keynes and Lewis, when they are speaking 
about conventions, are really studying the same object (or the same kind of 
practice). The concept of coordination problems is, we argued, a fundamental 
element of similarity. But now we must be more explicit: is it the same “thing” 
that has to be coordinated, when Keynes and Lewis talk about conventions? 
There is something striking when we have a closer look at the list of 11 exam-
ples given by Lewis: 9 out of 11 are “small” everyday problems, and the last 
two are quite different (more akin to Keynes’s centers of interest): money and 
language. But what is common to all (with the partial exception of the last one, 
as we will see) is the fact that what has to be coordinated is an external behav-
ior, an objectively observable action. Indeed the project of Lewis is completely 
behaviorist, since he wants to build a general theory of conventional behavior, 
without anything like a language (nor all the correlated attitudes and represen-
tations). The Keynesian convention is not primarily about actions: as already 
noted, if everybody mimics everybody on the financial market, the market 
breaks down.  
The formal definition of convention by Lewis confirms the behaviorist spirit 
of his theory (we will quote it in its entirety, all the more so since it is the only 
one used by most readers):20 
A regularity R in the behavior* of members of a population P when they are 
agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, 
                                                             
20  The asterisks * are used to mark those aspects of the first definition that will be changed in 
the second one. 
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and it is common knowledge21 in P that, in any instances of S among members 
of P: 
/1/  everyone conforms to R; 
/2/  everyone expects everyone else to conform to R; 
/3/ everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible 
combinations of actions*; 
/4/ everyone prefers that everyone conforms to R, on condition that at least all 
but one conform to R; 
/5/ everyone would prefer that everyone conform to R’, on condition that at least 
all but one conform to R’, 
where R’ is some possible regularity in the behaviour of members of P in S, 
such that no one in any instance of S among members of P could conform 
both to R’ and to R. (Lewis 1969, 76) 
The reader should notice that a convention is a regularity in the behavior of 
human agents, and that is coherent with 10 of the 11 examples selected by 
Lewis. Unfortunately the ultimate goal of Lewis was to explain the 11th exam-
ple: language. And soon after publishing the book, he became conscious that 
his theory of conventions could not explain what is conventional within lan-
guage. Here comes the second chance for the birth of EC … 
3.1.2 The Conventionalist Turn of the Corrected 1969 Formal 
Definition of Convention 
So Lewis has a theory about appropriate actions in the context of a problem 
coordination. What about language? The first step is signaling systems, where a 
conventional signal is emitted to give rise to a suitable action. What is needed 
is a “convention of truthfulness” with respect to that signaling system. The next 
step is the extension to the case where the signals giving rise to suitable actions 
are “actions of uttering verbal expressions”; it corresponds to a rudimentary 
language. A convention of truthfulness is still enough to produce two-sided 
coordination. The third step is the realistic one: there is a speaker in front of a 
hearer (one or many). The convention of truthfulness is once more necessary as 
for the speaker, but it fails for two-sided coordination: what action is expected 
from the audience? Lewis has to imagine an intricate story about coordination 
between past and present speakers It was one of his colleagues Jonathan Ben-
nett who convinced him that it was a dead end – while giving him a seemingly 
extraordinarily elegant solution: The expected “answer” to a truthful speaker is 
not an action, it is a belief.22 The question is, will the hearer trust the speaker or 
                                                             
21  That means that the various facts listed in conditions /1/ to /5/ are known to everyone, it is 
known to everyone that they are known to everyone, and so on. 
22  The reader interested in the treatment of beliefs, in logic and philosophy, could refer to the 
collection of essays by Bogdan (1986). 
HSR 44 (2019) 1  │  38 
not? And trust is not an action but a belief. So if belief does not enter the gen-
eral definition of convention along with action, there is no hope of applying a 
general theory of convention to the case of language. What is required by two-
sided coordination is a convention of truthfulness and trust in the relevant 
language. 
This is the first difference23 between the old and the new definition (cf. 
clause /1/): conventions are now regularities in action, or in action and belief, 
instead of being exclusively in action. But that is not enough, of course, since 
conformity may now include beliefs and no longer simply actions. Whereas we 
choose conformity in action because we prefer (conditional) conformity (cf. 
clause /3/), we choose conformity in beliefs only if we have good reasons to 
adopt new beliefs. So clause /3/ has to be restated in terms of reasons (not only 
epistemic, as we have just seen, to cover the new case of belief, but also practi-
cal, to cover the previous case of action), rather than in terms of preferences.24 
That is the second difference; and that is all: we could keep the remainder of 
the old definition, to get the new one. It looks as if the suggested change is a 
complete success: by slightly altering his definition, he may keep his theory. 
But of course, it is the contrary: the behavioral spirit of the project is totally 
rejected. And it is a fact that Lewis did not write any longer about conventions, 
although his 1969 book (without his 1971 correction) was to be more and more 
used by mainstream economists. 
It will be conventionalist economists who will catch and develop the intui-
tions hidden in the revised definition of convention. Let us review the most 
important ones. Instead of only one definition of conventions (a regularity in 
action), we have two (a regularity in action, or in action and belief). Therefore 
Lewis meets Keynes, in the end. Lewis had a fine intuition – but limited to 
conventions centered on observable behaviors (let me call them A-
conventions), whereas Keynes introduced conventions to understand two kinds 
of regularities (the level of interest rate, the existence of orthodox economics), 
centered on beliefs (let me call them B-conventions).25 EC needs both.  
But reconciling Keynes and Lewis entails another change in Lewis’s initial 
definition, this one not envisioned by Lewis. To say it in one sentence, Keynes 
would not accept the clause related to “Common Knowledge” (now CK), be-
cause of his rejection of standard rationality with respect to uncertainty. Or in 
other words, EC turns upside down the logical order between conventions and 
language. David Lewis thought that in order to understand language, and be-
                                                             
23  See the first * in the definition given supra.  
24  See the second * in the definition given supra. The clause /3/ becomes: “This belief that the 
others conforms to R gives everyone a good and decisive reason to conform to R himself.” 
25  The hypothesis of a duality of conventions is most frequent in the literature: cf. the refer-
ences given in Favereau (2008, 125), to which I should now add Diaz-Bone (2016): conven-
tions with or without semantic content. 
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fore understanding language, you have to understand conventions. EC is based 
on the inverse thesis: in order to understand conventions, and before under-
standing conventions, you have to take language into account. 
This last point needs a separate development – which will lead us to discover 
the concept of practice, at the core of EC. As he moves from the initial definition 
to the new one, Lewis has to move from the logic of choice of actions (which 
could be tackled by a mainstream computational rationality) to the logic of 
reasons, be they epistemic or pragmatic. But he acts as if the conventional 
model of rationality could be kept unchanged. The logic of reasons makes it 
impossible, because language now becomes a prerequisite of rationality, far 
from being an application of it.26 Then the new, conventionalist, model of ra-
tionality switches from computation to interpretation, from instrumentalism to 
realism, from explaining to understanding,27 which will help the reader to grasp 
the final part of our digest of EC supra. Of course, in that new world, CK be-
comes the last residual piece of mainstream rationality. It must be abandoned. 
If we are not content with CK as a characterization of coordinated representa-
tions, what is the alternative? We should be aware that this question is one of 
the most difficult questions in the human and social sciences: how can one 
build a theory of coordination upon unobservable entities?  
Here is a tentative answer. We have been led to acknowledge the possible 
existence of conventions as “regularities in action and/or belief.” What is the 
mechanism that may bring some coherence between actions (observables) and 
beliefs (unobservables)? Let us take the risk of being simple on this complex 
matter:28 people see actions (A), interpret them (i.e., attributing beliefs [B] 
behind those actions), ask questions and entertain discussions about the link 
between both A and B, “in a population P” (it is time to give to this part of 
Lewis’s definition the importance it deserves). Sometimes, the interdependence 
between A, B, and P, acquires some approximate stability, at least for a time.29 
Then we should call this connection a “practice” or, better, a “social practice.” 
If this is a reasonable epistemological position, and I think it is, then the onto-
logical equipment of the researchers in economic and social sciences should be 
reinforced: we need a scientific model of the world, populated not only (as 
                                                             
26  For a thorough treatment of this point (through the critics of James Coleman’s individualist 
project for sociology) see Favereau (2005). 
27  Friedman (1953) advocates instrumentalism by explaining that a champion of billiard does 
not need to know the theorems of physics his behavior will respect – nevertheless we can 
use the theorems to predict his behavior. But if we are to forecast the decision of a top 
manager, we could not skip knowing his reasons. 
28 This risk should be taken, because it is a problem in everyday life. And we can observe this 
problem is solved more often than not. Why would researchers be less clever than ordinary 
people? 
29  Objects will play an important role in this process of stabilization, as stressed from the 
beginnings of EC; cf. Livet and Thévenot (2004) for an early formulation and Favereau 
(1998, spec. p. 214-220) for a first synthesis from the point of view of a theory of rules. 
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mainstream economics) with objective (A) and subjective (B) entities, but also 
with intersubjective30 entities (like our practices = “A + B, in a population 
P”).31 A scientific revolution in social sciences (at least in economics), to be 
sure. 
It seems the practice of economics has no choice but to turn to an economics 
of practice. Since the proof of the cake lies in its eating, let us show how it will 
help the economist to understand the nature of the firm, i.e., the most vexing 
question of economic literature,32 as every economist knows.  
3.2 The Economics of the Firm Is the Economics of a Practice 
Up to the 1970s, mainstream economics has no real theory of the firm. Of 
course, in the mathematical models of the general equilibrium theory, there is 
an individual called the “producer,” who is symmetrical to another individual 
called the “consumer.” He takes decisions maximizing his profits subject to the 
constraint of a production function, summarizing the set of efficient technolo-
gies available to him. But no great economist would have pretended that it is a 
satisfactory representation of what it means to run a business. Their theoretical 
criterion was different. It was to find a concept of firm, connecting goods mar-
kets (Y) and production factors markets (K & L) – and the mathematical tool 
“function of production” (Y=F(K,L)) does the job with a beautiful parsimony. 
At that time the market was the only means of coordination. Therefore, what 
happened inside the firms was not important to understand what happens out-
side. 
Things have changed radically during the 1970s with the emergence of a 
new mainstream theory of contracts and incentives, often using game theory as 
a tool. The firm is no longer a black box, since it is filled with interindividual 
contracts, explained by microeconomic models of non-cooperative rational 
individual agents, each maximizing his utility. Beside mainstream economics, 
transaction cost economics, initiated by Coase (1937) and popularized by Wil-
liamson (1985), had a deeper intuition: what happens within a firm reveals the 
existence of a non-market mode of coordination: managers give orders to their 
employees, according to the usual labor contract. But the mainstream and the 
transactionist models have in common the fact that corporate governance 
                                                             
30  On intersubjectivity, see Bessy (2006), Fullbrook (2002), Ricoeur (1986) on Husserl, and my 
reference to Karl Popper’s worlds I, II III and to Charles Taylor’s illuminating theory of “social 
practice” (cf. Favereau 2008). 
31  Or according to a more complete characterization (cf. n. 29 supra): “A+B, in a population P, 
with O” where O stand for “Objects.” 
32  A so-called Nobel Prize in economics was awarded to Ronald Coase in 1991, for a paper 
entitled “the nature of the firm” written in… 1937, which shows how much the economic 
discipline is embarrassed by the firm: 44 years after the publication, whereas modern firms 
exist at least in law since the second half of 19th century! 
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should privilege the interests of the share-holders who are, so they think, the 
owners of the firm. And that consensus re-unifies the academic community, 
within the individualist or coordination tradition, during the neo-liberal years of 
financialization, from 1970 to … nowadays. 
3.2.1 When EC Introduces Firms as a Practice, It Finds an Ally in 
Foucault’s Methodology33  
In spite of its brevity, this summary is enough to introduce the seminal ad-
vancement we could make by working along EC lines, as indicated supra. 
What is the state of the art? I have just recalled that in the individualist or coor-
dination tradition, managers have to contract with workers on behalf of share-
holders, in the standard business firm. In the opposite holist or Reproduction 
tradition, the firm is the locus of a structural conflict of interest between Capital 
(share-holders and managers) and Labor (workers). Since EC renounces that 
lazy divide and wants to interweave the language of efficiency and the lan-
guage of power, the problem of viability faced by any firm seems even more 
complicated than when we use only one language, and neglect the other one.  
The (harder) problem of firms could be more precise. They do not function 
in an institutional vacuum. In the present capitalist world, at least since the 
second half of the 19th century, it is simply impossible to have firms (in gen-
eral) without creating a new legal person: the corporation (US law) or the com-
pany (UK law), through a contract signed between the shareholders who bring 
the initial finance. Then to speak about firms, we need a first organization, 
most precise and definite, whose members are the shareholders and only them. 
If that organization (the corporation or the company) stays alone, nothing hap-
pens for share-holders. But of course, the new legal person will sign contracts, 
find buildings, hire labor, buy equipment,34 procure tools and materials etc., 
i.e., create a second organization, for which there is no overall legal definition, 
including (or interacting with) workers, suppliers, consumers, creditors, bank-
ers, sub-contractors, neighbors, local authorities, central state, trade-unions, 
natural environment, etc. Indeed the list is endless. “Firm” or “enterprise” does 
not belong to the legal vocabulary, stricto sensu, whereas “corporation” or 
“company” does.  
Two comments: (i) a theory of (let us say) “firm” needs not one concept, but 
two, of which one is clear-cut, thanks to law (and to the concept of legal per-
                                                             
33  André Orléan (with Grenier) was the first conventionalist economist to guess the importance 
of Foucault’s lectures in 1978 and 1979 for economic analysis (Grenier and Orléan 2007). 
34  It is the legal person, which owns the productive assets. When we say that share-holders 
own the firm, as Friedman in a famous paper (1970), we simply “forget” law to the benefit 
of a truncated economic analysis: we choose a practice of economics that does not respect 
what law says about its own concepts, even the most fundamental one like ownership. 
HSR 44 (2019) 1  │  42 
sonality), and the other is not35; (ii) we begin to understand why economics has 
an endless debate on “the nature” or “the limits” of the firm. Nowadays, with 
the ecological crisis, we are tempted to insert neighbors or even the link with 
the environment within the limits of the “firm.” There is also a permanent 
query about integrating or not the suppliers. Even more surprising: few people 
know that before the legal formalization of the labor contract (around the years 
1920) and the recognition of the legal person as the true employer (rather than 
some sort of foreman, i.e., an individual himself contracting with the capitalist 
owning the equipment), workers were not functionally integrated into the 
“firm.”36 It is a painful lesson for the economic discipline: the business firm is 
an organization which does not know its limits.37 The obvious conclusion is 
that there is no essential content of firm: it is not a ‘universal,’ it is a practice 
and here comes the link with Foucault’s methodology,38 when explaining his 
new concept of “governmentality”.39  
Let us quote at length the opening methodological paragraph of the opening 
seminar at Collège de France, for the academic year 1979. The reader should 
be conscious that the seminar was to be (and in fact was) entitled “The birth of 
biopolitics,” but Foucault changed his mind and decided rather to concentrate 
on governmentality.40 
This immediately entails a choice of method that one day I will finally try to 
come back to at greater length, but I would like to point out straightaway that 
choosing to talk about or to start from governmental practice is obviously and 
explicitly a way of not taking as a primary, original, and already given object, 
notions such as the sovereign, sovereignty, the people, subjects, the state, and 
                                                             
35  This fundamental point originates in the collective work at the Collège des Bernardins from 
2009 to 2018: cf. Favereau (2014) for a first application to the economic theory of the firm. 
For an overview of that multidisciplinary approach of the firm (economics, law, sociology, 
management, anthropology), the following books are useful: Roger (2012), Segrestin and 
Hatchuel (2012), Favereau and Roger (2015), Auvray, Dallery and Rigot (2016), Favereau 
(2016), Segrestin and Vernac (2018). 
36  Cf. Jacoby (1985, chapter 1 “The way it was: factory labor before 1915”, 13-38). 
37  Either legal limits or “cognitive” ones – since the goal of the practice called a firm is, of 
course, to produce profitable goods and services, but through a collective recurrent dynam-
ics of innovation. In a nutshell: it is a device or a dispositive of collective creation (or organ-
izational learning): see footnote 41 infra.  
38  There are other ways of mobilizing Foucault for renewing the theory of management 
(Hatchuel et al. 2005; Gomez 2015). My analysis is centered on the economic theory of the 
firm, according to EC. 
39  Introduced for the first time in his lecture of February 1, 1978, but at the center of the 
stage only in the course of the 1979 lectures. 
40  Defined as “the study of the rationalization of governmental practice in the exercise of 
political sovereignty” (Foucault 2008, 2). “Practice” is the core of the definition, but it would 
be a misinterpretation to neglect ‘rationalization’: the relevant practice is not a blind one. It 
includes a second-order practice of reflexivity about the first-order practice. It is the only 
way to make sense of the notion of “dispositive” or “device,” so much used by Foucault, and 
which builds another bridge between EC and Foucault’s methodology, as we will see infra. 
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civil society, that is to say, all those universals employed by sociological anal-
ysis, historical analysis, and political philosophy in order to take account for 
real government practice. For my part, I would like to do exactly the opposite 
and starting from this practice as it is given, but at the same time as it reflects 
on itself and is rationalized, show how certain things – state and society, sov-
ereign and subjects, etc. – were actually able to be formed, and the status of 
which should obviously be questioned. In other words, instead of deducing 
concrete phenomena from universals, or instead of starting with universals as 
an obligatory grid of intelligibility for certain concrete practices, I would like 
to start with these concrete practices and, as it were, pass these universals 
through the grid of these practices. (Foucault 1979 [2008], 2-3) 
What he says about sovereign, state, people, civil society, etc., is exactly what 
EC wanted to say about the firm. The firm is not a universal, contrary to the 
spontaneous position of mainstream economics (be it an individual, a produc-
tion function, a nexus of contracts, a governance structure or a non-market 
mode of resource allocation), it is a practice. The critical reader may object that 
what we have in common depends on the content we give to only one single 
word: practice.41 To answer that objection, we have to show how it is connect-
ed with “convention.” By doing so, which means by strengthening the parallel-
ism with Foucault’s methodology, we will unintentionally reveal a weakness of 
his thought about law, and then about governmentality, neo-liberalism and 
socialism. Foucault missed the firm, as a source of power rival to the state 
power. 
3.2.2 When EC Introduces Conventions into Practices, It Fills a Gap 
in Foucault’s Methodology42 
Thanks to the second Lewis (with some extensions), we expect that when there 
is a social practice, in the context of a coordination problem, a convention 
could emerge, which will stabilize the social practice. A mathematical meta-
phor may be useful for the reader: this three-term process43 could be summa-
rized by the idea of a moving fixed point. Therefore, the problem becomes: we 
have started to see a practice behind the notion of firm, but where is the coordi-
nation problem, of which the convention may appear as a solution? 
The coordination problem results directly from the legal foundations of 
capitalism. Let us concentrate on capital and labor. If shareholders remain 
alone between themselves within the limits of the legal entity they have just 
                                                             
41  With this proviso: Is ”device” or ”dispositive” another link, especially if EC sees firms as a 
device of collective learning (cf. supra n. 37)? We will show in the conclusion that ”prac-
tice,” ”convention” and ”dispositive” are three articulated concepts, belonging to the same 
analytical space. 
42  Once more Grenier and Orléan (2007) were the first to pinpoint some weaknesses in Fou-
cault’s framework, especially with respect to law.  
43  Or four-term, if we include objects (cf. supra n. 29 & 31).  
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founded, no benefit will result for them: they need to go outside the limits of 
the corporation (i.e., their own collectivity!) and hire labor (at least), who will 
manufacture goods, the sale of which will generate profits. But workers too 
need corporations to hire them; otherwise their fate will be rather dark. So 
capital needs labor as much as labor needs capital – a paradigmatic example of 
a coordination problem. Any coordination would be less bad than no coordina-
tion at all. Now we know from extensive historical experience that the asym-
metry of wealth situations between capitalists and workers will naturally lead 
to a type of coordination, vastly unfavorable to workers. And the asymmetry is 
consolidated by law itself. Because the shareholders have created the corpora-
tion, they – and only them – elect the members of the board where the strategy 
of the firm is decided and controlled. Remember the workers are members of 
the firm but not of the corporation!44 The coordination problem then deepens 
and, in a sense, transforms itself. Why? Because the consequence of this struc-
tural asymmetry becomes nearly as much negative for capital than it is for 
labor, especially in the last decades, when an active involvement of employees 
are more and more a prerequisite for a high firm performance. Therefore, the 
coordination, in order to be favorable enough for share-holders should not be 
too much unfavorable to workers. In the Keynes/Lewis framework, that means 
a convention becomes vital to alleviate this coordination problem, if not to 
solve it. A convention is never sure; nevertheless its possibility is ardently 
urged. 
These highly speculative and abstract considerations on the business firm 
are fortunately corroborated by our historical experience. What is striking is the 
emergence at long scattered intervals and afterwards the resilience of a collec-
tive representation of the firm, which nearly all agents will find obvious, even 
quasi-natural, and which makes the asymmetry not unbearable.45 During the 
two or three decades after World War II an entirely new conception of firm 
appears: managers should be let free to modernize at will, on the condition that 
workers’ real wage follow the labor productivity trend. We could call this the 
“Fordist” or the “social-democrat” or the “Keynesian” convention.46 Since the 
1970s, it was replaced progressively by a new convention, justifying share-
holders’ primacy by the idea that they are the true owners of the firm. This 
collective representation is all the more surprising that it is (i) wrong from the 
point of view of law;47 (ii) considered as undisputable by a huge majority of 
                                                             
44  Except if they buy shares! 
45  Not a very strong justification, indeed, which explains the continuous resurgence of criti-
cism, and the unavoidable final breakdown of the existing convention (cf. Boltanski and 
Chiapello 2005; Favereau 2014, 2018). 
46  Cf. the “Regulation theory” (Boyer and Saillard 2002). 
47  See the three independent 1999 publications of Robé (for French law), Ireland (for English 
law), and Blair and Stout (for US law). For a highly readable introduction, the reader should 
refer to Kay (2015) in the “FT”: clearly these matters are not all pure academics!  
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people; (iii) accompanied by no legal revolution in business law – as if the 
interpretation of rules changed without a corresponding change of content. If 
the reader remembers the EC project is to displace the conventions of econom-
ics, it should be clear that these two historical examples could not be made 
intelligible without re-mixing the two traditions of thought, respectively on 
coordination and reproduction.  
So we can conclude that the methodological proximity with Foucault is not 
just a question of words. It is substantial. Nevertheless a problem appears within 
Foucault’s thought: an essential part of the problem comes from law:48 the 
capacity of private agents (business firms) to create legal persons, a privilege 
which remained for centuries between the hands of states, and which states 
were obliged to concede to private agents in the second half of the 19th centu-
ry.49 It seems that Foucault, probably because of his suspicion towards a causal 
reference to law, has missed – indeed like a majority of researchers in social 
sciences50 – this turning point, and that leads him unfortunately to miss the 
firm. What Foucault says about the firm in the 1979 lectures (cf. 2008, 147-50) 
is very poor. For him, the enterprise is the entrepreneur, that is an individual, a 
physical person.51 He did not mention codetermination (i.e., the 50/50 division 
of the boards instituted in the strategic sectors of the German economy, soon 
after the end of the war) in his story of the German neo-liberalism. Then Fou-
cault seems to be of no help to understand the present crisis of the neo-liberal 
governmentality, whose main feature is the loss of sovereignty of states (public 
legal persons), with respect to the biggest transnational firms (private legal 
persons): 52 if you do not have the concept53 of legal person vs. physical persons 
                                                             
48  And there is no solution within law: extending the legal person up to all stake-holders is 
practically and logically impossible. The solution should only come from new practices, in-
cluding a new practice of law, as is the case with codetermination (a European practice 
without any theoretical foundation, either in law or in economics – up to now. My hope is 
that EC may bring at least parts of the missing foundations). For an empirical overview of 
the practice of codetermination in Europe, see Waddington and Conchon (2016). 
49  Through a competition between the first industrial nations to stimulate the developments 
of firms on their territory, rather than on the territory of neighboring countries. 
50  Two bright exceptions: the economic historian North and his colleagues Wallis & Weingast 
(2009) and the lawyer Robé (cf. his collected writings – some in English – published in 2015). 
51  Paradoxically, Foucault remained stuck on the old conception of the “subject” or the “per-
son,” whereas the concept of legal person (always driven by physical persons) would have 
better matched the ”structuralist theory of social action” he was looking for (I intentionally 
use the sub-title of the first edition of White’s book on identity and control, which was an-
other source for EC). 
52  Cf. the ”fundamental political trilemma of the world economy” by Dani Rodrik (2011, 200): 
”we cannot have hyperglobalization, democracy and national self-determination all at one. 
We can have at most two out of three.” 
53  A concept with an extremely long and difficult genesis: cf. Descombes (2013, especially 
chapter 4). 
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(a basic element in law), you can only put superficial words upon that phenom-
enon. 
This critical conclusion may be unfair to the visionary thought of Michel 
Foucault. Although he did not see where the problem could come from, he 
might have (fore)seen where the solution could come from. I quoted the lecture 
of January 13, 1979. I must now quote the lecture of January 31, with these 
strange reflections on socialism, where he leaves the running thread of his 
lectures to speak no longer for the audience but seemingly for himself – as a 
question to be addressed in a remote future. 
In short, whether or not there is a theory of the state in Marx is for Marxists to 
decide. As for myself, I would say that what socialism lacks is not so much a 
theory of the state as a governmental reason, the definition of what a govern-
mental rationality would be in socialism, that is to say, a reasonable and calcu-
lable measure of the extent, modes, and objectives of governmental action. 
[…] 
I do not think that there is an autonomous socialist governmentality. There is 
no governmental rationality of socialism. In actual fact, and history has shown 
this, socialism can only be implemented connected up to diverse types of gov-
ernmentality. It has been connected up to liberal governmentality, […]. We 
have seen it function, and still see it function, within governmentalities that 
would no doubt fall more under what last year we called the police state, that 
is to say, a hyper-administrative state in which there is, so to speak, a fusion, a 
continuity, the constitution of a sort of massive bloc between governmentality 
and administration. […] 
What would really be the governmentality appropriate to socialism? […] In 
any case, we know only that if there is a really socialist governmentality, then 
it is not hidden within socialism and its texts. It cannot be deduced from them. 
It must be invented. (Foucault 2008, 92/93/94) 
EC also meets Foucault for this following new reason. Without his inspired 
work, we could not have even imagined the following conjecture: socialism 
lacks an appropriate theory of governmentality because we all lack an appro-
priate theory of the practice called a firm – especially of the peculiar practice of 
codetermination, as a possible basis for a new convention, alternative to the 
previous ones, Fordist or neo-liberal.54  
4. Conclusion 
To conclude, the objective of this contribution was to prove that EC is deeply 
embedded in the economic discipline, with its two roots, Keynesian and Lewis-
ian, but its branches and foliage are quite often interwoven with other human 
                                                             
54  This is developed in my report to the International Labour Organization (Favereau 2018). It 
extends a previous one (Favereau 2016). 
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and social sciences: some are well known since the beginning (sociology), 
others were explored in this contribution: law, more precisely company law, 
because of our recent research on the theory of business firm. An unexpected 
connection springs up with the methodology of Michel Foucault’s historical 
and political philosophy, through the common use of the notion of practice. 
The concept of convention is illuminated by the concept of practice, and in-
versely, the concept of convention is a very effective and operational tool if not 
for all social practices, at least for very important ones, as well as more mun-
dane ones. In both cases, we have the same components: Actions (A), Beliefs 
(B), in a Population (P), with Objects (O). The result of the interaction between 
these elements is probably not substantially different (a kind of moving fixed 
point), but in one case, it is thought rather from a behavioral polarity, and in the 
other one, from a cognitive polarity. Anyway it is secondary. 
What is not secondary, is another term, device or dispositive, frequently 
used both by Michel Foucault and by conventionalists. It is striking that the 
“family resemblance” – to use Wittgenstein’s phrase – was established only 
recently, through the conventionalist research on business firms.55 But this time 
Foucault’s use is much more precise: “the nature of the dispositive is essential-
ly strategic. […] it is always embedded in a power-game.” In the remainder of 
its very long characterization by Foucault (1994, 299-300),56 it is not so diffi-
cult to find the four constitutive elements we have brought together, to deal 
with either practices or conventions: A, B, P, and O.57 If we recall the “essen-
tially strategic” nature of dispositives, largely absent from conventions and/or 
practices, which are supposed to be rather spontaneous, we are led to the fol-
lowing proposition: Foucault’s dispositives are EC’s conventions or practices 
loaded with intentionality,58 but of a collective type.59 
                                                             
55  Cf. the bibliographical note in Roger (2012, 101-3) or in Favereau (2014, 139-42). I am 
deeply grateful to Rainer Diaz-Bone for this highly insightful remark. 
56  According to Callewaert (2017), the long and important interview of Foucault in the well-
known psychanalytic journal Ornicar in 1977, reprinted in Foucault (1994, 298-329), has 
only been partially translated in English by Gordon (Foucault, 1980, 194-228). So I give my 
own translation. 
57  The reader should remember that what Foucault calls “discourses,” “rules,” “theories,” etc., 
are translated in our EC (post-Lewisian) vocabulary as “Actions” and “Objects” (objectively 
observable) and “Beliefs” (intersubjectively deduced from practices). 
58  The possibility of intentionality within dispositives proceeds from the reflexivity we have 
observed, at various degrees, for conventions and practices. 
59  Bessy and Chateauraynaud (2018, in this issue) display some strategic use of quality conven-
tions by forgers (faussaires), who exploit naivety of the public (or even experts). See also 
Ghirardello (2018, in this issue) for a related point. Clearly Foucault’s project goes much be-
yond individual opportunism. The difference could be summarized by saying that Foucault is 
interested in macro-dispositives, not micro-dispositives (a distinction briefly introduced in 
our work on firms (Favereau 2014, 108). EC has rather studied micro-dispositives (ex.: a rule 
is a collective cognitive dispositive, a firm is a dispositive of organizational learning, etc.). 
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The structure and the elements of the intersubjective world, instantiated by 
practices and/or conventions, are obviously a source of power for those agents 
or groups of agents who have the capacity to move (parts of) the conventions or 
the practices in the direction of their interests, because of (i) their personal or 
collective awareness of the interdependence between A, B, P, and O, and (ii) of 
their personal or collective control of the mechanisms or processes of evalua-
tion on A and B.60 Power as constraining obedience is a crude form of power, 
relative to power, as enacting or influencing what is valuable, and what is not.  
François Eymard-Duvernay, in his last contribution (2012) to the conven-
tionalist research on business firms, introduced the concept of “pouvoirs de 
valorization.”61 We all knew that it was an extremely innovative advance in the 
research program of EC, but from 2012 up to the preparation of this issue of 
HSR with Rainer Diaz-Bone we did not know how to use it.  
Now we know.  
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